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Rónán Ó Fathaigh 
 
This week the Fourth Section of the European Court delivered its much anticipated judgment in 
Mosley v. the United Kingdom, which unanimously held that the absence of a prior-notification 
requirement on newspapers to give advance notice to a person before publishing private details 
does not violate Article 8.  
 
The applicant in Mosley had successfully brought legal proceedings against a British newspaper 
for invasion of privacy over a series of articles which detailed the applicant’s sexual encounter 
with a number of prostitutes. It was also alleged that the applicant had engaged in Nazi role play 
during the sexual encounter. The articles had been based on a clandestine recording, and the 
video was made available on the newspaper’s website. The domestic courts found that there had 
been no Nazi element to the sexual activities, and held there had been a violation of the 
applicant’s right to privacy, awarding £60,000 in damages. 
 
Having been successful in the domestic proceedings, the applicant took the unusual step of 
making an application to the European Court. The applicant argued that the award of damages 
was not an adequate remedy for a violation of privacy, and that the only effective remedy would 
have been an injunction to prevent publication. It was argued that the failure of the United 
Kingdom to impose a legal duty upon newspapers to give prior-notification to a person before 
publishing private details was a violation of its positive obligations under Article 8. It was argued 
that such a duty would provide a person with the opportunity to seek an injunction to prevent 
publication.  
 
The Court considered that the question before it was whether to ensure effective protection of the 
right to respect for private life, the positive obligations under Article 8 include a requirement of a 
legally binding pre-notification rule.  
 
Before answering the question, the Court made as number preliminary observations: the Court 
noted that there were already a number of measures in effect in the United Kingdom to ensure 
the protection of privacy, including a system of self-regulation of the press, the availability of 
civil proceedings, an entitlement to seek an interim injunction should a person be aware of an 
impending publication, and there was further protection under data protection legislation. Most 
importantly, the Court was of the opinion that it had implicitly accepted in its case law that ex 
post facto damages provide an adequate remedy for violations of Article 8 arising from 
publication by a newspaper of private information, referring to Von Hannover v. Germany, and 
Armonienė v. Lithuania.     
 
The Court continued that there were three main issues relevant to the question before it: (a) the 
margin of appreciation; (b) the clarity of the proposed prior-notification rule; and (c)  the chilling 
effect of a prior-notification requirement.  
 
Firstly, in relation to the margin of appreciation, the Court reiterated that member states in 
principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation relating to positive obligations under Article 8. It 
noted that there was already a system in place to protect privacy, and the Court also referred to a 
UK parliamentary committee report which had concluded that a prior-notification requirement 
was undesirable. Of note, the Court held that notwithstanding the highly personal nature of the 
information disclosed concerning the applicant, this could have no bearing on the margin of 
appreciation, as the prior-notification requirement being called for would have an impact far 
beyond the applicant’s case. Moreover, the Court noted that the applicant had not cited one 
single jurisdiction which had a prior-notification requirement in place. Thus, according to the 
Court, the United Kingdom enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in terms of its positive 
obligations.    
 
Secondly, the Court recognised that there were major concerns with the effectiveness of a prior-
notification rule: the Court accepted that there would need to be some sort of ‘public interest’ 
defence to any such rule, which would be based on a reasonable belief. Otherwise, the Court 
noted, there would be a serious chilling effect on speech. It followed, according to the Court, that 
even had there been such a rule in effect in the applicant’s case, it was probable that the 
newspaper would have chosen not to notify the applicant, as it would have taken the view of 
relying on a public interest defence.  
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the Court noted that any prior-notification rule would only be as 
effective as the sanctions imposed for non-observance of the rule. The Court considered that civil 
fines would be unlikely to deter newspapers publishing material without prior-notification, and 
made reference to the fact that the newspaper in the instant case would probably have run the 
risk of non-notification. Thus, punitive or criminal sanctions would be the only effective 
sanction, and the Court considered that such sanctions would have a broader chilling effect on 
political reporting and investigative journalism, which attract a high level of speech protection.  
 
Finally, the Court emphasised that there was a particular need to look beyond the facts of the 
applicant’s case and to consider the broader effect such a requirement would have on the press 
generally. 
 
Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court concluded that Article 8 did not require 
a legally binding pre-notification requirement. Thus, the United Kingdom had not breached its 
positive obligations to adequately protect privacy, and there had been no violation of Article 8.  
 
Comment 
 
As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the judgment delivered by the Fourth Section 
continues in the same vein as its other judgments delivered this year relating to freedom of 
expression: substantial, very well reasoned, heavy case citation, and unanimity (see MGN 
Limited v. the United Kingdom, Kasabova v. Bulgaria, and Bozhkov v. Bulgaria). This is in 
stark contrast to other speech related judgments delivered from other sections of the Court which 
suffer from sparse reasoning and selective citation (see, for example, Sipoş v. Romania). It is 
more than obvious that third party interveners greatly assist in the quality of the reasoning, and 
this is only to be welcomed. 
 
More substantially, it is worth noting the important principles which the Court sought to espouse: 
the Court seemed to be tempering the development of positive obligations under Article 8, noting 
the importance of a prudent approach to such developments (citing Karakó v. Hungary). The 
Court also reiterated that while Article 10 does not prohibit the imposition of prior restraints on 
publication, the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful 
scrutiny. However, it did sound a word of warning that sensationalist and lurid news reporting 
does not attract the robust protection of Article 10, where freedom of expression requires a 
narrow interpretation. 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Fourth Section has now applied the chilling effect consideration 
as a central tenet in its reasoning in all its speech related judgments in 2011, and none more so 
than in Mosley: the Court laid particular emphasis on the need to look beyond the facts of the 
particular case, and to focus on the broader chilling effect such a prior-notification rule would 
have.  
 
All in all, the judgment in Mosley should be welcomed, and its unanimity would seem to suggest 
that a hearing before the Grand Chamber may not materialise.   
 
     
 
 
    
